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It has been suspected that abnormalities in social inference (e.g., learning others' intentions) play a key role in the
formation of persecutory delusions (PD). In this study, we examined the association between subclinical PD and
social inference, testing the prediction that proneness to PD is related to altered social inference and beliefs about
others' intentions. We included 151 participants scoring on opposite ends of Freeman's Paranoia Checklist (PCL).
The participants performed a probabilistic advice-taking task with a dynamically changing social context (vola-
tility) under one of two experimental frames. These framesdifferentially emphasisedpossible reasons behind un-
helpful advice: (i) the adviser's possible intentions (dispositional frame) or (ii) the rules of the game (situational
frame). Our design was thus 2 × 2 factorial (high vs. low delusional tendencies, dispositional vs. situational
frame). We found signiﬁcant group-by-frame interactions, indicating that in the situational frame high PCL
scorers took advice less into account than low scorers. Additionally, high PCL scorers believed more frequently
that incorrect advice was delivered intentionally and that such misleading behaviour was directed towards
them personally. Overall, our results suggest that social inference in individuals with subclinical PD tendencies
is shaped by negative prior beliefs about the intentions of others and is thus less sensitive to the attributional
framing of adviser-related information. These ﬁndings may help future attempts of identifying individuals at
risk for developing psychosis and understanding persecutory delusions in psychosis.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Delusions represent a hallmark of psychosis and are conceptualized
as false beliefs based on incorrect inference about the external world
that persist in the face of disconﬁrmatory evidence (DSM-IV 2000,
p. 765 and DSM-5 2013, p. 819). The most prominent delusional beliefs
pertain to the social world, speciﬁcally that other indviduals' intentions
are of persecutory nature (Bell and Halligan, 2013). Persecutory delu-
sions (PD) shape the experience of 70% of ﬁrst episode psychosis pa-
tients and 50% of patients from the schizophrenia spectrum(Freeman,
2007; Freeman and Garety, 2014; Sartorius et al., 1986), and are related
to reduced psychological well-being (Freeman et al., 2014) and higher
risks of violence (Keers et al., 2014).
The understanding of delusions as abnormal beliefs and their immu-
nity to disconﬁrmatory evidence led to inﬂuential concepts that sug-
gested abnormalities of Bayesian inference (i.e. inference based on
integrating observations with prior beliefs) as the cause of delusion for-
mation (Coltheart et al., 2010; Hemsley and Garety, 1986). The notion
that delusional ideation may be associated with abnormal inference
has previously been related to the Jumping to Conclusions (JTC) bias
in delusions (e.g., (Garety et al., 1991; Peters and Garety, 2006; So
et al., 2012; Speechley et al., 2010); but see (Ermakova et al., 2017;
Moutoussis et al., 2011) for alternative interpretations).
A more recent Bayesian account of delusions refers to the interplay
between prior beliefs and prediction error (PE) signals (Corlett et al.,
2016; Corlett et al., 2010; Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Sterzer et al.,
2018). This derives from one prominent Bayesian perspective on
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perception – predictive coding (Friston, 2005; Rao and Ballard, 1999) –
which proposes that the brain infers the causes of its sensations using a
hierarchical model of the external world. This model is assumed to rep-
resent beliefs that provide top-down predictions about sensory inputs,
which are then adjusted by PEs at each level of the hierarchy. According
to hierarchical Bayesian schemes, delusion formation might reﬂect a
compensatory response to deﬁciencies of hierarchical inference
(Adams et al., 2013; Corlett et al., 2016; Fletcher and Frith, 2009). Spe-
ciﬁcally, delusions might result from efforts to “explain-away” abnor-
mally precise low-level PEs leading to adaptation of beliefs at higher
levels in the processing hierarchy (Adams et al., 2013; Schmack et al.,
2013). If these PEs are “chaotic” and result from usually unremarkable
events (cf. “aberrant salience”; (Heinz, 2002; Kapur, 2003; Shaner,
1999)), adopting general and overly precise higher-level beliefs, may
be a way of making sense of these events.
Adopting precise higher-level beliefs is crucial in social contexts,
since human intentions are typically concealed (Biedermann et al.,
2012). Previous studies linking Theory of Mind (ToM) and PD found
that patients with PD have difﬁculty taking contextual factors into ac-
count when thinking about others' intentions and exhibit an enhanced
externalising bias (i.e., a tendency to blame others rather than the situ-
ation for negative events, see (Craig et al., 2004; Langdon et al., 2006;
Lincoln et al., 2010a); but also see (Martin and Penn, 2002; McKay
et al., 2005)). This tendency to attributing harmful intent to others has
also been associated with subclinical persecutory ideation (Raihani
and Bell, 2017, 2018).
In this study, we investigated social inference in individuals with
subclinical PD tendencies. Based on the notion of rigid high-level beliefs
playing a crucial role in PD and assuming that PD is a dimensional con-
struct, we generally expected that (1) individuals with subclinical ten-
dencies towards PD should behave less adaptively in dynamic social
contexts and (2) should be less sensitive to experimentalmanipulations
of attributional biases (experimentally-induced priors).
Adopting a dimensional perspective on PD (Van Os et al., 1999), we
invited participants from the general population scoring either high or
low on the Paranoia Checklist (PCL; (Freeman et al., 2005; Lincoln
et al., 2010b)). To investigate social inference, we employed an iterative
probabilistic advice-taking paradigm. We probed the inﬂuence of attri-
butional priors on social inference by introducing two experimental
frames with minor differences in how the cause of incorrect advice
was framed: First, a dispositional frame served to direct participants' at-
tention to the adviser's character – namely, that the adviser acted inten-
tionally in order to achieve his/her own (unknown) goals. Second, a
situational frame directed participants' attention to the contextual as-
pects of the task – namely, that the adviser's behaviour was not only in-
ﬂuenced by his/her intentions but also by the incompleteness of the
information available to him/her. Individuals with relatively agnostic
beliefs about the adviser were expected to learn and adhere to advice
differently depending on how the taskwas framed. By contrast, individ-
uals with proneness to PD were expected to be governed more by their
own high-level beliefs than task-induced attributional priors. Thus, we
predicted group-by-frame interactions in participants' decisions to ad-
here to advice during our social inference paradigm (Hypothesis I). Fur-
thermore, we expected that high PCL scorers vs. low PCL scorers would
attribute incorrect advice less to the adviser having incomplete informa-
tion (Hypothesis II), and rather attribute negative events (e.g. bad per-
formance on the task) to external-personal causes (Hypothesis III).
Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that high PCL scorers would attribute in-
correct advice more to the adviser as a person than to themselves or
the social context (Hypothesis IV). Additionally, we predicted that
high PCL scorers would expect misleading advice (Hypothesis V) and
believe that the adviser's giving incorrect advice was directed towards
them personally (Hypothesis VI). For an overview of the hypotheses,
their operationalization, and the results see Supplementary Fig. 1 in
the Supplementary material.
These hypotheseswere deﬁned in an analysis planprior to data anal-
ysis (https://gitlab.ethz.ch/sibak/sibak-analysis-plan). For a summary of
all hypotheses and results, please see Supplementary Fig. 1. Notably, the
hypotheses addressed in this paper refer exclusively to behavioural
readouts from the task or to self-reportmeasures. An independent anal-
ysis of the behavioural data that adresses additional hypotheses using a
computational model of learning and inference is presented in a sepa-
rate paper (Diaconescu et al., 2019).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Pre-screening
Participants were recruited from the general population via online
platforms for students and locals and via print adverts at stores. N =
1145 individuals were pre-screened online with the Paranoia Checklist
(PCL; (Freeman et al., 2005; Lincoln et al., 2010b), intermixed with
distractor items from the NEO-FFI (McCrae and Costa, 2004)), allowing
us to assign individuals to groups characterised by high (“high PD”) or
low tendencies towards PD (“low PD”). The PCL is a self-report ques-
tionnaire consisting of 18 items representing statements linked to para-
noid ideation. Subscales include frequency of the thoughts occurring,
conviction, and distress. Group assignment was based on the frequency
subscale. See Fig. 1 for the distribution of PCL frequency scores in our
pre-screened sample.
The inclusion criteria for participating in the online pre-screening
were as follows: (i) age 18 or older, (ii) ﬂuent German comprehension,
and (iii) absence of current treatment. The groups were deﬁned in ref-
erence to the mean and standard deviation of the PCL scores obtained
in healthy volunteers by Freeman et al. (2005).We used these reference
values in order to enable continuous inclusion of participants during on-
going prescreening. Participants scoring 0.5sd above this mean were
assigned to the high PD group and those scoring 0.5sd below were
assigned to the low PD group.
In order to reduce the possibility of group assignment being based
on a transient expression of persecutory ideation, participants assigned
to one of the two groups were invited to ﬁll in the online questionnaire
again (screening), four weeks after participating in the pre-screening,
whichwas the case forN=344. Only individualswhose score remained
outside the 0.5 sd intervals described above when completing the PCL
for the second time were invited to the experiment, where they
Fig. 1. Histogram of PCL frequency scores in pre-screening sample. The PCL frequency
subscale assesses frequency of paranoid thoughts (18 items), with 0=“less than once
every month” and 4=“at least once a day”; the highest possible score is 72. N = 1145
individuals ﬁlled in the questionnaire during pre-screening. This sample: mean= 7.73,
median = 5.0, sd = 8.39, range = 0–52. Measures reported by Freeman et al. (2005):
mean= 11.9,median= 9.0, sd= 10.5, range= 0–64.
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completed the PCL for a third time. The latter served to exclude any sys-
tematic differences in PCL scores obtained online versus on site.
2.2. Sample
We used a 2 × 2 factorial between-subject design with two partici-
pant groups assigned pseudo-randomly to two experimental condi-
tions. Based on a power analysis (using g-Power (Faul et al., 2007)), a
sample size of N = 146 was computed for a minimum of 80% power
at α= 0.05 under a moderate effect size (Cohen's f2 = 0.25), required
to run a two- and three-way ANOVA. Concerning the effect size, while
there are no previous results that exactly relate to our questions, we
sought guidance by a previous study (Diaconescu et al., 2014) which
used the same type of task and reported a moderate effect size for a re-
lated question.
Assuming a drop-out rate of 10% (based on studies using the same
task by Diaconescu et al. (2014, 2017)), we invited 162 participants to
the experiment, and matched low PD and high PD participants regard-
ing age, education, and proportion of male vs. female. Eleven partici-
pants were excluded from analyses based on previously deﬁned
exclusion criteria (speciﬁed in an analysis plan, time-stamped before
completion of data acquisition and analyses (https://gitlab.ethz.ch/
sibak/sibak-analysis-plan)).
Only participantswith an average score over all three questionnaires
(pre-screening, screening, and experiment day) that was outside the±
0.5 sd intervals were included in the analyses, which was the case for
151 of the 162 individuals.
2.3. Experiment
2.3.1. Experimental procedure
After providing informed consent, participants received written
standardised task instructions. To ensure that they understood the
task, they were asked to explain it in their own words and performed
a practice round (8 trials) in which they were truthfully informed that
advice validity was ﬁxed to chance.
After completing the task, participants ﬁlled out a task-speciﬁc
debrieﬁng questionnaire and were administered a cognitive screening
– the symbols-test (coding) and the letters-numbers test (working
memory) of the Brief Neurocognitive Assessment (BNA; (Fervaha
et al., 2014)) to control for the potential inﬂuence of cognitive deﬁcits
on social inference. (Ventura et al., 2013) It was administered after the
task to avoid possible inﬂuences of cognitive load on social inference
(Gilbert and Osborne, 1989). After ﬁlling out the PCL again (Freeman
et al., 2005; Lincoln et al., 2010b), participants were reimbursed and
debriefed about the study before they left.
2.3.2. Task
The task used in this study is a modiﬁed version of the advice-taking
task used by Behrens and colleagues (Behrens et al., 2008) (see Fig. 2),
which has been used in a similar form in previous studies (Diaconescu
et al., 2014, 2017).
Participants played a probabilistic lottery for monetary rewards try-
ing to predict a binary outcome (blue or green) trial by trial (210 trials).
Two sources of information, a social and a non-social cue, were pre-
sented on each trial. The latter was a pie-chart displaying a veridical
probability distribution indicating what colour was more likely to win
on any given trial. The pie-chart displayed different green-blue ratios
(50:50, 55:45, 60:40, and 75:25) on each trial thus variying in its predic-
tive uncertainty. The social cue (the advice) was represented by a
videotaped adviser (recorded in a previous study (Diaconescu et al.,
2014)) who gave a recommendation on which colour to choose, by
holding up a card (blue or green). All participants were truthfully in-
formed that the adviser did not have full information – and thus could
make errors unintentionally – and that each piece of advice had been
videotaped in a prior study with the same task (Diaconescu et al.,
2014). In the Diaconescu et al. (2014) study, an additional control task
whichwasmatched in terms of volatility was conducted, in order to en-
sure that the main task truly captured social learning (learning from
Fig. 2. Plot of task structure and trajectory of advice validity. Participants made binary decisions (blue vs. green) based on a social and a non-social cue (advice and pie-chart) presented
simultaneously. Correct predictions result in the accumulation of points growing a progress-bar towards the targets displayed. Surpassing the targets earnedparticipants additional CHF 10
(silver) or 20 (gold). After predicting the ‘winning’ colour they were informed regarding the real outcome. Pie-chart probabilities varied between 50:50, 55:45, 60:40, and 75:25. Advice
validity varied across 210 trials (boxcar-chart): the ﬁrst 42 trials consisted of predominantly (p= 0.8) correct advice (1st stable helpful phase), followed by 126 trials of highly variable
advice validity (volatile phase). In the last 42 trials, advice was highly valid with p = 0.8 again (2nd stable helpful phase). The sequence of trials was ﬁxed and identical across all
participants. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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changing intetions). In the control task participants acting as advisers
chose the green or blue cards (their “advice”) from a card deck which
was accurate in either 80% or 20% of the trials. “Advisers” were blind-
folded. This allowed the authors to control for the social aspect of the
task, while matching the statistical structure of both pie chart informa-
tion and cue-outcome relations identical. Performance in the control
task differed signiﬁcantly from performance in the main task, even
when the card deck was 80% accurate, suggesting that an adviser hold-
ing up the cards in a seemingly intentional way was processed differ-
ently, which was also captured by a learning model incorporating a
social-bias parameter (for more information see (Diaconescu et al.,
2014)). Learning in this task should thus be driven by social inference
about the adviser's intentions and not represent pure learning of statis-
tics structure. We used one female and one male adviser, and adviser
sex was balanced across groups and conditions.
Participants had to make predictions by integrating the two cues.
After each decision, they received feedback on their choice and the cor-
rect outcome. Players accrued points with every correct prediction. By
achieving a cumulative score exceeding the silver or gold targets, partic-
ipants earned an additional bonus, amounting to approx. 1/6 (silver) or
1/3 (gold) of the experiment's base reimbursement.
The task contained phases of differing advice validity; it began and
ended with periods of high advice validity (p = 0.80, 42 trials each)
and an intermediate period (126 trials) with changes in the advice-
outcome contingency (volatility). The trial structure and sequence
were ﬁxed and identical across all participants.
2.3.3. Experimental conditions
The two experimental conditions (attributional frames) differed in
how potentially unhelpful advice was framed: dispositional (caused
by the adviser) vs. situational (caused by the rules of the game). Criti-
cally, neither of the frames provided false information but summarised
the adviser's role from different angles.
In the dispositional frame, participants' attentionwas directed to the
adviser as a potential source of variability in advice validity, emphasiz-
ing his/her ability of acting intentionally in order to achieve his/her
own (unknown) goals. In the situational frame, attention was directed
to the role of the adviser as part of the task, highlighting that he/she
was instructed to use the information available to him/her for guiding
the player's behaviour. We induced the two frames by (i) one sentence
in the instructions that differed between the two frames, (ii) a reminder
on the task start-screen, and (iii) thewording used regarding advice va-
lidity. For more details, see the Supplementary material.
3. Results
3.1. Sample characteristics
151 of the 162 participants who took part in the experiment scored
outside the ±0.5 sd intervals of the PCL Frequency scale over all three
questionnaire assessments (pre-screening, screening, experiment
day),whichwas the cut-off for group assignment, andwere thus eligible
for analysis. Theywere on average 28 years old andhad 15.8 years of ed-
ucation (Table 1).
Sixty-four of 151 participants did not have an academic background.
As expected, participant groups differed across all subscales of the PCL
(see Table 2).
Furthermore, no signiﬁcant difference between groupswas detected
regarding the cognitive screening administered (BNAworkingmemory:
t=0.43, p=0.67; BNA coding: t=−1.20, p=0.23). It is thus unlikely
that differences in task behaviour could stem from differences in cogni-
tive capacity.
Participants also did not differ signiﬁcantly in terms of performance
accuracy on the task (two-tailed t-test, df= 149, t=−1.82, p= 0.07)
with high PD participants' accuracy averaging at 0.60 and low PDpartic-
ipants' at 0.61. Furthermore, both groups achieved a similar amount of
points (high PD participants earned 41 and low PD participants 47 on
average; two-tailed t-test, df= 149, t=−1.74, p= 0.08) and reached
the silver target on average.
3.2. Hypotheses
All following results represent main outcomes of hypothesis tests
that were deﬁned in a time-stamped analysis plan prior to data analysis
(Analysis plan: https://gitlab.ethz.ch/sibak/sibak-analysis-plan, data:
https://www.research-collection.ethz.ch/handle/20.500.11850/
333102, and code: https://gitlab.ethz.ch/sibak/sibak-behavior-paper).
Additional effects (both signiﬁcant and nonsigniﬁcant ones) of sec-
ondary importance are reported in the Supplementary material (see
Supplementary Fig. 1 for a summary of all hypotheses and results).
This paper only reports analyses relating to task-behaviour (Hypotheses
I–VI) and the “non-model based approach” in the analysis plan; for cor-
responding computational analyses, see (Diaconescu et al., 2019).
In addition to inferential statistics (parametric or non-parametric
tests, depending on the distribution of the data), we report effect size
estimates (η2partial for multiple regression analyses, Cohen's d for t-
tests, and Cohen's r for non-parametric tests; (Fritz et al., 2012)).
3.2.1. Hypothesis I: high PD participants take information provided by the
frame less into account than low PD participants (H0 rejected)
We hypothesized that individuals with tendencies to PD behave less
adaptively towards differences in social information as they rely on rigid
high-level beliefs. We thus expected high PD participants to be less sen-
sitive to the framing effect than low PD participants. We applied a two-
wayANOVAwith an interaction term (group, frame, and group x frame)
to the participants' choices, i.e., how often they chose the colour recom-
mended by the adviser. This group-by-frame interactionwas signiﬁcant
regarding participants choosing according to advice overall (df =
(1150), F=5.77, p=0.018, η2partial=0.04). Speciﬁcally, the interaction
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of participants eligible for analyses.
Experimental frame Low PD group High PD group
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
Dispositional
Age 29.42 (9.65) 18–67 26.47 (8.29) 18–49
Education (years) 17.12 (3.70)⁎ 11–26 15.31 (3.11)⁎ 9–21
N 41 (15 male) 36 (15 male)
Situational
Age 28.8 (9.74) 18–54 28.15 (11.03) 18–56
Education (years) 15.71 (4.22) 8–26 14.97 (3.86) 7–23
N 40 (17 male) 34 (15 male)
N= 151, no differences in demographic variables detected between groups. Groups are
not of equal size due to drop-outs (not responding to the invitation or no-shows) and par-
ticipants being excluded from analyses after data acquisition based on previously deﬁned
criteria (see Supplementary material).
⁎ p b 0.05, two-tailed t-tests, does not survive Bonferroni correction. All other variables:
p N 0.05, two-tailed t-tests.
Table 2
Questionnaire scores of participants eligible for analyses.
Low PD group High PD group
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
PCL
Frequency⁎⁎⁎ 0.33 (0.34) 0–2 19.06 (5.43) 11–33
Conviction⁎⁎⁎ 0.92 (1.57) 0–11 20.44 (5.77) 6–35
Distress⁎⁎⁎ 17.88 (14.80) 0–46 27.96 (7.86) 11–44
BNA numbers-letters test 15.09 (3.49) 6–21 15.33 (3.43) 8–21
BNA symbols test 86.64 (14.10) 59–133 83.76 (15.41) 60–121
N = 151. Average PCL scores across the three questionnaire assessments. PCL subscales
differed between groups.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.001, two-tailed t-test, unequal variances, Bonferroni corrected. Regarding BNA
scores (cognitive performance) no differences were detected between groups, p N 0.23.
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plot in Fig. 3a suggests that low PD participants more readily made de-
cisions in accordance with the advice under the situational frame
(highlighting incorrect advice as circumstantial) than under the disposi-
tional frame (emphasizing incorrect advice as potentially caused by the
adviser's intentions).
A post-hoc two-tailed t-test demonstrated that this difference be-
tween frames was signiﬁcant in the low PD group (df = 79, t =
−5.55, pBonferroni=7.3e-07, Cohen's d=0.36). In contrast, no signiﬁcant
difference in advice-taking behaviour between framing conditions
could be detected in high PD participants (df = 68, t = −1.52 p =
0.13, Cohen's d= 0.11), suggesting that they did not integrate and uti-
lize the information provided by the frame.
3.2.2. Hypothesis II: high PD participants attribute misleading advice valid-
ity to the adviser's character rather than to the possibility of the adviser
making a mistake due to incomplete information. (H0 not rejected)
We tested this hypothesis with regard to participants' advice-taking
in the task phases where advice was stable and helpful vs. when advice
validity was highly variable. We predicted that in the situational frame,
high PD participants would more frequently choose against the advice
when it was volatile, and that this frame-speciﬁc difference between
volatile and stable phases would be stronger than in low PD
participants. In the dispositional frame, we expected smaller group dif-
ferences. However, this three-way interaction was not signiﬁcant
(phase*group*frame: F = 0.29, p = 0.59, η2partial = 0.002, see Fig. 3c
and the Supplementary material for more information and analyses).
3.2.3. Hypothesis III: high PD compared to low PD participants generally at-
tribute negative events to more external-personal causes. (H0 not rejected)
We tested this with debrieﬁng question 14 (“In your opinion, what
factors determined your performance in the task?”, participants distrib-
uted a total of 100% to the following answer options: “a. You as the
player”, “b. The adviser which was appointed to you”, and “c. The rules/
the structure of the game”). This hypothesis was not conﬁrmed (see Sup-
plementary material for more information).
3.2.4. Hypothesis IV: high PD participants attribute differences in advice va-
lidity to the adviser being malevolent. (H0 rejected)
We hypothesized that high PD participants exhibited more negative
beliefs about the adviser and more readily attributed differences in ad-
vice validity to the adviser's character than low PD individuals and
that this effect would be moderated by the framing. We tested this
with debrieﬁng item “The adviser intentionally gave false information,
without proﬁting from it.”, which states a possible cause for incorrect
Fig. 3. ANOVAs for advice-taking behaviour ANOVAs. While no differences in advice-taking between frames were identiﬁed in high PD participants, low PD participants took advice into
account less frequently in the dispositional vs. the situational frame. a. Two-way interaction for taking advice overall: group*frame: F=5.77, p=0.018, η2partial=0.04 frame: F=22.71, p
= 4.4754e-06, η2partial = 0.13. b. Main effects regarding agreement with statement: “The adviser intentionally provided incorrect advice in order to prevent me from scoring points” (H. VI)
group: F= 11.01, p= 0.001, η2partual = 0.07 frame: F= 27.39, p= 5.63e-07, η2partial = 0.16. c. Three-way interaction for taking advice in stable vs. volatile phases: phase*group*frame:
F = 0.29, p = 0.59, η2partial = 0.002 phase*frame: F = 0.15, p = 0.7, η2partial = 0.001 phase*group: F = 3.86, p = 0.051, η2partial = 0.03 Y-axes show percentages, error bars indicate
standard errors of the mean.
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advice. Participants had to indicate how much they believed this cause
played a role for the adviser providing incorrect advice (percentage as-
signment 0%–100%).While the interactionwas not signiﬁcant, themain
effect of groupwas (df=(1150), F=16.87 p=6.63e-05, η2partial=0.1).
On average, high PD participants assigned 38.6 ± 29.2% to this state-
ment whereas low PD participants assigned 20.3 ± 25.9%.
In the debrieﬁngquestionnaire, participantswere asked to ratewhat
caused incorrect advice, and assign percentages to the adviser and to the
rules of the game (debrieﬁng question 13: “When the adviser provided
you with misleading/incorrect advice:What do you believe was the cause
of this?”). Participants distributed a total of 100% to the following an-
swer options: “a. The adviser which was appointed to you” and “b. The
rules/the structure of the game”. Given the nature of the distributions
(percentages assigned to the different answer options were tied be-
cause they had to sum up to 100%), we used a Wilcoxon rank sum test
to compare groups. As expected, high PD participants were more likely
to rate the adviser as the cause for incorrect advice (40.0±23.8%), com-
pared to low PD participants (29.6±27.7%; z=2.42, p=0.008, Cohen's
r= 0.2).
3.2.5. Hypothesis V: high PD participants expect receiving misleading ad-
vice. (H0 not rejected)
We tested this hypothesis with the debrieﬁng questionnaire (ad-
ministered after the task), where we askedwhat advice participants ex-
pected to receive before playing the game (1 = correct advice, 6 =
incorrect advice).We expected an interaction effectwith high PD scoring
higher than low PD participants in the situational frame but not the dis-
positional frame. While this interaction did not reach signiﬁcance, both
main effects did, showing that low PD participants scored lower on this
scale on average (2.81±1.18), indicating a tendency towards expecting
correct advice compared to high PD participants (3.45± 1.19) than low
PD participants (main effect of group; df=147, F=11.72, p=8.0e-04,
η2partial = 0.07, see Supplementary for full statistics).
3.2.6. Hypothesis VI: high PD participants view incorrect advice as directed
towards them. (H0 not rejected)
This could be directly assessed via debrieﬁng questionnaire item
“The adviser intentionally provided incorrect advice in order to prevent
me from scoring points.” (percentage assignment 0%–100%). We origi-
nally expected an interaction here, with low PD participants assigning
higher percentages to this statement in the dispositional compared to
the situational frame and high PD participants assigning high percent-
ages across framing conditions. However, only the main effect of
group reached signiﬁcance (df= (1150), F= 11.01, p = 0.001, η2partial
= 0.07), with high PD participants endorsing the statement more (39
± 31.9%) than low PD participants (23.6 ± 29.2%, see Fig. 3b).
4. Discussion
In this study, we investigated how individuals scoring high vs. low
on the Paranoia Checklist (PCL; (Freeman et al., 2005)) incorporate at-
tributional priors into learning from advice. Participants performed a
probabilistic advice-taking paradigm with variable advice-outcome
contingencies under one of two experimental frames which differen-
tially emphasised causes of social information (dispositional vs. situa-
tional attributional frames).
We found that low PCL scorers took advice into account less under
the dispositional (highlighting the adviser as the cause for incorrect ad-
vice) vs. the situational frame (highlighting incorrect advice as circum-
stantial), whereas high PCL scorers did not differ between framing
conditions (Fig. 3a). High PD participants' behaviour is similar to what
was reported in a recent study using the “dictator game” (Raihani and
Bell, 2017); the authors induced two differing experimental contexts
(being at the receiving end of a dictator's decisions or a third-person ob-
server) and found that persecutory ideation was related to attributing
harmful intent, irrespective of context (Raihani and Bell, 2017). Low
PD participants' advice-taking behaviour corresponds to what
Fouragnan et al. found in a recent study, namely that prior knowledge
about an agent's reputation generally inﬂuences learning about inten-
tions (Fouragnan et al., 2013). Speciﬁcally, healthy participants relied
on experimentally-induced reputation priors in a social learning task,
even in light of disconﬁrming evidence.
Our dispositional frame, introduced a negative prior about the
adviser's intentions, prompting low PD participants to disregard advice
more often. The group-by-frame interaction (Fig. 3a) indicates that low
scorers' advice-taking behaviour seemed to be driven by these
experimentally-induced priors. High scorers however disregarded the
advice irrespective of experimental frame, even in the “safer” social con-
textwhen the rules of the gamewere emphasised as causes for incorrect
advice.
One explanation for high PD participants' lack of differences in
advice-taking behaviour across frames, might be that – rather than the
experimentally-induced priors – their high-level prior beliefs about
the adviser's intentions inﬂuenced their decisions. Speciﬁcally, from
the perspective of hierarchical models of Bayesian inference, when
low-level beliefs (e.g. about trial-by-trial behaviour) are ambiguous
(have high variance) and higher-level beliefs (e.g. about the intentions
of others) are held with more conviction (precision), perception and
learning will be more strongly inﬂuenced by higher-level beliefs. Thus,
the reduced impact of the framing in this study might reﬂect high PD
participants' reliance on strong (precise) higher-level prior beliefs in
the face of weaker (less precise) experimentally-induced, lower-level
predictions. This explanation is in line with ﬁndings showing an in-
creased inﬂuence of prior beliefs on the perception of ambiguous stim-
uli (Schmack et al., 2013) as well as reduced use of experimentally-
induced priors in delusion-prone individuals (Stuke et al., 2018), sug-
gesting that delusion(−proneness) is characterised by differences in
the precision of prior beliefs at different levels of the processing
hierarchy.
Indeed, high PD participants reported viewing the adviser as the
main cause of incorrect advice, as opposed to considering the adviser
having incomplete information (e.g., Hypothesis 4, debrieﬁng question
13 “When the adviser provided you with misleading/incorrect advice:
What do you believe was the cause of this?”, high PD participants agreed
morewith “The adviserwhichwas appointed to you”). Furthermore, com-
pared to lowPDparticipants, they reported expectingmisleading advice
more (Hypothesis 5) and viewing the adviser as acting intentionally
malevolent towards them more (Hypothesis 6).
These ﬁndings suggest that high PCL scorers relied on overly precise
negative higher-level prior beliefswhen inferring on the adviser's inten-
tions Following a reviewer's suggestion to scrutinise this interpretation
in additional exploratory analyses, we investigated whether partici-
pants' conviction scores on the PCL (obtained prior to the experiment)
were related to how they answered debrieﬁng questionnaire item
11.3 (“The adviser intentionally provided incorrect advice in order to pre-
vent me from scoring points.”). We found that the higher the conviction
ratings regarding persecutory beliefs as assessed with the PCL, the
more the participant judged the adviser as acting intentionally and ma-
levolently (F= 12.8, p= 0.0005, η2partial = 0.07).
An alternative interpretation for the lack of between-condition dif-
ferences in high PD participants might be that they did not believe the
experimental framing that was induced via task instruction. We do
not think this was the case, for the following reasons:
(i) We asked participants at the end of the debrieﬁng questionnaire
for feedback on different aspects of the study (debrieﬁng questions 17
and 18), whether the instructions were understandable (Q 19), and if
they felt inﬂuenced by them in how they viewed the adviser (Q 20)
and how they played the game (Q 21). None of the participants men-
tioned suspecting anything or being inﬂuenced. Furthermore, after hav-
ing been debriefed about the study and the framing, participants stated
not having suspected anything.
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(ii) Additionally, in the debrieﬁng questionnaire, we asked partici-
pants to indicate their agreement with two statements probing the in-
formation highlighted in the two experimental frames: The adviser
not having full information being the cause of incorrect advice in the sit-
uational frame (Q 11.5, “The adviser, in general, did not have full infor-
mation andmademistakes.”) and the possibility of the adviser being the
cause of incorrect advice in the dispositional frame (Q 11.4, “The adviser
intentionally provided false information because thiswas part of his/her
instructions/task.”).
We found a signiﬁcant main effect of framing, together with non-
signiﬁcant main effect of group and interactions (see Supplementary
Table 3 for detailed statistics). This suggests that (i) both high and low
PD participants viewed the adviser's incomplete information as a
more likely cause for incorrect advice in the situational compared to
the dispositional frame (Q 11.5) and that the adviser providing false in-
formation due to their instructions was the more likely cause for incor-
rect advice in the dispositional frame compared to the situational frame
(Q11.4). These effectswere expected based on the framing instructions.
Thus, participants generally seemed to have a similar understanding of
the framing and did not disregard the framing-speciﬁc instructions (see
8.2.1 and 8.2.1 in the Supplementary material for detailed statistics).
Our ﬁndings align with previous reports of theory of mind (ToM)
deﬁcits in psychosis patients with delusions, indicating an external-
personal attribution bias (Bliksted et al., 2014; Craig et al., 2004; Frith
and Corcoran, 1996; Langdon et al., 2001; Langdon et al., 2006), and ex-
tend these ﬁndings to subclinical PD. The association between social
cognition and PD in subclinical populations has thus far been inconclu-
sive ((McKay et al., 2005) and for a review see (Garety and Freeman,
2013)), potentially due to ToM paradigms being predominantly
questionnaire-based measures. Although recent investigations of
external-attributions in persecutory ideation captured dynamic aspects
of social inference (Raihani and Bell, 2017), how predictions are up-
dated as a result of contradicting evidence or PEs when information is
continuously changing has not been examined yet.
The results of this study suggest that individuals with PD tendencies
may incorporate PEs less into their predictions about the adviser's in-
tentions due tomore rigid high-level prior beliefs about the adviser's in-
tentions. In a separate analysis, computational modelling of our data
suggested that maladaptive social inference in the task may result
fromoverly precise higher-level beliefs about the adviser'sﬁdelity, lead-
ing to reduced belief-updating in the face of incoming PEs (Diaconescu
et al., 2019).
In this study, we aimed to capture the behaviour of individuals for
whom persecutory ideation was a stable trait. Since impairments of so-
cial cognition might contribute to risk for developing psychosis and are
found inﬁrst-episode psychosis (FEP) patients (Bora and Pantelis, 2013;
Sun et al., 2011), future extension of our approach might serve to ad-
dress clinically-relevant predictions, such as transition to psychosis in
clinical high risk individuals and treatment response in FEP patients.
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